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"Mr. President, no one is saying you broke any laws, we're just saying
it's a little bit weird you didn't have to."
- John Oliver2
As the papers in this symposium3 and conflicting lower court
opinions4 demonstrate, serious commentators reviewing the National
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs that have been revealed
through recent leaks are far from unanimous that the programs are
iJacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, Ohio State
University. I am grateful to the symposium authors and to my colleague Dakota Rudesill
for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript.
2 The Daily Show: Good News! You're Not Paranoid -NSA Oversight (Comedy Central
Broadcast, June 10, 2013), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-june-
10-2013/the-daily-show-with-john-oliver.
3 Compare John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency's Bulk Data
Surveillance Programs, 1o ISJLP 301-326 (2014) (defending NSA surveillance), with
Katherine Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association's
Specificity Requirement, 1o ISJLP 327-365 (2014) (challenging NSA metadata collection
under the First Amendment) and Laura Donohue, PRISM and the Interception of
Communications Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 1o ISJLP
599-639 (2014) (challenging NSA's current programs of electronic surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment). On possible statutory challenges to the legality of the metadata
collection programs, see text at notes 7-18, infra.
4 Compare ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 27, 2013) (upholding against
Fourth Amendment challenge the NSA's bulk collection of telephone metadata), with
Klayman v. Obama, No. 13 Civ o851(RJL) (D.D.C., Dec. 16, 2003) (finding the NSA's bulk
collection of telephone metadata in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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lawful. The point of John Oliver's joke, however, still rings true:
Somehow, our laws have evolved to a stage where lawyers could
plausibly defend the government's entitlement to capture and store an
immense volume of our telephone and online communications, as
well as metadata about both. For many Americans, this is a
breathtaking reality. The point of this article is to explain our legal
evolution as a way of providing context for the I/S symposium on
"NSA Surveillance: Security, Privacy, and Civil Liberty." It will
introduce the papers that follow, and offer some concluding thoughts
on the issues of executive power that lurk behind the controversy.
Specifically, I want to suggest that what may seem like an oddly mixed
performance record in the history of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court may best be explained as a reflection of that court's
willingness to indulge in surprisingly expansive executive branch
readings of the government's statutory surveillance authority in order
to maintain some significant judicial leverage to protect privacy in the
administrative implementation of that authority. As unsatisfactory an
institutional compromise as this may seem in principle, it may be
better than having an executive branch that thinks itself beholden
only to its own construction of its inherent constitutional powers.
I. INTERCEPTING COMMUNICATION CONTENTS: FROM OLMSTFAD TO
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
Prior to the late 196os, the federal government did not interpret
law as constraining its entitlement to collect the contents of
communications through electronic surveillance for either criminal
investigation or national security purposes. The Supreme Court had
held in 1928 that a wiretap was not a Fourth Amendment "search,"
because it involved neither physical trespass, nor the seizure of a
tangible thing.5 Three years later, Attorney General William D.
Mitchell issued the first authorization for telephone wiretapping, then
aimed at syndicated bootleggers. 6
In 1934, Congress enacted a legal ban on wiretaps, providing in
the Federal Communications Act that it would be a felony for any
person "to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and
radio communications."7 Although the Supreme Court held the
5 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928).
6 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1 (1978)
(hereinafter, "House FISA Report").
7 47 U.S.C. § 605 (effective Feb. 8, 1996).
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prohibition applicable to federal agents7-thus rendering wiretap
evidence inadmissible at trial-the Justice Department interpreted the
law and the Court's decisions as forbidding only the public divulgence
of intercepted communications, not wiretapping itself.8 As a result,
when President Roosevelt informed the Attorney General in 1940 of
his view that counterintelligence wiretaps were constitutional, the
Justice Department did not perceive any Fourth Amendment bar to
their use for national security purposes. 9
The government expanded its use of national security wiretaps
from the Roosevelt through the Nixon Administrations. The Truman
Administration even abandoned the Roosevelt policy of limiting its
targets "insofar as possible" to aliens.1o The Eisenhower
Administration took the position that surreptitious physical entry to
conduct wiretapping was likewise legally authorized." As recounted in
a House report: "From the relatively limited authorization of
warrantless electronic surveillance under President Roosevelt... the
mandate for the FBI was quickly expanded to the point where the only
criterion was the FBI's subjective judgment that the 'national interest'
required the electronic surveillance. '"12
With two critical decisions, however, the Supreme Court radically
changed the relevant legal landscape. The Court's 1967 decision in
Katz v. United States13 overruled Olmstead and applied the Fourth
Amendment's warrant provision to electronic surveillance in
connection with a criminal prosecution. Congress responded by
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968,14 creating standards to govern, and a process for obtaining,
criminal wiretap warrants. The Act explicitly provided, however, that
it worked no change in the President's authority to engage in
surveillance "to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
7Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 3o8 U.S. 338
(1939).





13 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 8oi, 82 Stat. 197, 211-218 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (2012)).
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essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities."15
Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the Supreme Court proceeded to
decide, in the 1976 Keith case,16 that warrantless surveillance was also
unconstitutional in the context of wholly domestic national security
investigations. At least where "[t]here is no evidence of any
involvement, directly or indirectly, of a foreign power,"7 the Court
found no categorical exception to the warrant requirement. In
balancing the competing values at stake, the Court observed: "Though
the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in [national
security] cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally
protected speech."18
The Keith Court went beyond its Fourth Amendment holding to
opine that the requirement of prior magistrate approval for national
security warrants did not demand that such warrants be issued only
on grounds identical to Title III criminal prosecution warrants.1 9 The
Court expressly invited Congress to tackle the problem, stating:
"Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens."20
Congress's acceptance of the Court's invitation, however, was
colored by revelations in 1975 and 1976 that the CIA, FBI, and other
intelligence-gathering units within the executive branch had engaged
in massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations during the Nixon
administration.21 Reports of CIA abuse led President Ford to name an
eight-member commission (including future President Reagan) under
15 Pub. L. No. 9 o-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)).
16 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The case is commonly
known by the name of the U.S. District Court Judge whose order was under review.
17 Id. at 309.
18 Id. at 313.
19 Id. at 322.
20 Id.
21 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities - Book 2: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S.
REP. No. 94-755, at 1-2o and passim (1976); see generally Final Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities -
Book 3: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976).
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Vice President Rockefeller to investigate alleged CIA statutory
violations.22 On January 15, 1975, CIA Director William Colby
presented a lengthy report to the Senate Appropriations Intelligence
Operations Subcommittee, acknowledging that the CIA had carried
out surveillance of journalists and political activists, opened the mail
of U.S. citizens, infiltrated domestic protest groups and gathered
information for secret files on more than 10,000 Americans.23 Twelve
days later, the Senate established an eleven-member select committee
under Senator Frank Church ("Church Committee") to investigate the
activities of the CIA, FBI, and other law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to determine if they had engaged in any illegal or unethical
intelligence activities during the Vietnam period.24 (A parallel study
was later undertaken in the House of Representatives, under Rep. Otis
G. Pike, of NewYork.)25
What followed in the wake of Keith and the Church Committee
report was an intense interbranch collaboration between Congress
and, first, the Ford Administration, later the Carter Administration,
on the drafting of what became the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA).26 FISA was enacted on Congress's understanding,
in which Attorneys General Levi and Bell concurred, that "Congress
has at least concurrent authority to enable it to legislate with regard to
the foreign intelligence activities of departments and agencies of this
Government either created or funded by Congress."27 As described in
22 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIAACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES, at ix (1975).
23 Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities: Report of the Committee on Government
Operations to Accompany S. Res. 40o Resolution to Establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, And For Other Purposes, S. REP. NO. 94-675 at 4 (1976).
24 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities - Book 1: Foreign and Military Intelligence, S. REP. NO. 94-755 at 2-
3 (1976).
25 Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue
Elephant, STUD. INTELLIGENCE 81-92 (Winter 1998-99), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for -the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vo142no5/pdf/v42i5ao7p.pdf.
26 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978); House FISA Report, supra note 6, at 13-14. For
a history of the drafting of FISA by a law professor who, as a government lawyer, was
directly involved in its development, see William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of
Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma - A History, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 1099 (2007). For a thoughtful journalistic account of the history of executive branch
and congressional interaction over the legal control and oversight of national security
surveillance, see Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, NEWYORKER, Dec. 16, 2013, at 48.
27 House FISA Report, supra note 6, at 24.
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a House committee report, Congress's "presumption" in designing
FISA was that "whenever an electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes may involve the fourth amendment rights of any
U.S. person, approval for such a surveillance should come from a
neutral and impartial magistrate."28
Even in its original form, FISA was a dauntingly complex statute.
It created an entirely new and unprecedented institution-the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)-to superintend the process of
authorizing foreign intelligence surveillance.29 The FISC's
membership, designated by the Chief Justice of the United States,
comprises 11 district court judges who must represent at least seven of
the United States judicial circuits. In addition, the Chief Justice
designates three judges-from either the district courts or courts of
appeals-to constitute a review panel to which the United States may
appeal any FISC decision denying a warrant application. The court's
novelty, other than in its membership and selection, lay in its secrecy.
Its proceedings are entirely ex parte; should the Government petition
for certiorari review of any decision adverse to the Government that is
upheld on appeal, what is now called the FISC Court of Review
transmits the record of the matter to the Supreme Court under seal.3o
Hidden in FISA's definitional sections, as well as in its operative
provisions, were a host of important policy decisions regarding the
scope of permissible surveillance. One was to permit the Attorney
General to authorize warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, for
a year at a time, where directed exclusively at communications
between foreign powers; 31 conversely, no authority was provided at all
under FISA for national security investigations that lacked any
international or foreign dimension. As a result, electronic surveillance
directed at a wholly domestic national security threat, as in Keith,
must still be authorized under the Title III probable cause standard.
For electronic surveillance directed at foreign intelligence,
however-assuming it is not exclusively between "foreign powers" as
defined in the Act-FISA makes a critical concession to the executive
branch in relaxing the standard for a surveillance warrant.
Specifically, it is not necessary, as with a Title III warrant, that
probable cause exist to believe the surveillance will yield evidence of a
crime; in applying for a FISA warrant, the Attorney General has to
28 Id. at 24-25.
29 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 103, 92 Stat. 1788 (1978), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
30 Id. at § 1803(a).
31 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1786 (1978), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18o2(a)(i).
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certify instead that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information" and the official certifying the warrant
application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court "deems the
information sought to be foreign intelligence information."32
The character of the information sought, however, is not sufficient
by itself to sustain a FISA warrant application. A FISA warrant-and
thus the relaxation of the probable cause standard-is available to the
government only if "the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."33 "United States
persons"-essentially, citizens and lawfully resident aliens-cannot
literally be "foreign powers," although surveillance directed at a
foreign power may cover such persons if they belong to a faction of a
foreign nation or nations, a group engaged in or preparing for
international terrorism, or a foreign-based political organization.34
Americans may also be targeted for surveillance if they are "agents of
32 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 104, 92 Stat. 1788 (1978), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18o4(a)(6)(A)
and (B). The USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 291 (2001) changed
"the purpose" in 50 U.S.C. § 18o4(a)(6)(B) to "a significant purpose."
FISA originally defined "foreign intelligence information," as follows:
(i) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against-,
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to,
and if concerning a United States person is necessary to-
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
Pub. L. No. 95-11, § 101, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(e)
(1982). In 2oo8, "sabotage or international terrorism" in subparagraph (1)(B) was deleted
and "sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction" inserted in its place. Pub. L. 110-261, § 11o(a), 122 Stat. 2466 (2008).
33 Pub. L. No.95-511, § 104(a)(4)(A), 92 Stat. 1789 (1978), codified as amended at 50 USC §
18o4(a)(4)(A).
34 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101(a), 92 Stat. 1783, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(a).
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a foreign power." This would include persons who knowingly aid and
abet acts in preparation for international terrorism.35
But perhaps FISA's most obscure policy choices are embedded in
its definition of "electronic surveillance."36 The definition of
"electronic surveillance" was written to cover several categories of
information acquisition by "an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device." Such a device is covered categorically if used to
intercept "any wire communication to or from a person in the United
States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition
occurs in the United States."37 If used to intercept the contents of any
radio communication, such a device is covered if the interception was
35 "Agent of a foreign power" means-
(i) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign
power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a) (4);
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in
clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of
the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the
United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the
United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the
conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities
for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statues of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities
for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or
activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Pub. L. No. 95-511, § ioi(b), 92 Stat. 1783, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(b).
36 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 1Oi(f), 92 Stat. 1785, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(f).
37Id. at § 101(f)(2), 92 Stat. 1785, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2).
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intentional and "under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended
recipients are located within the United States."38 With regard to both
wire and radio communications, interception is covered with regard to
any "communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if
the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes."39
What these definitions may well obscure for the uninitiated reader
are the categories of what is, in fact, electronic surveillance, but that
FISA apparently permits to proceed without warrants. Most notably,
communications wholly outside the United States are exempt, no
matter who participates. Also, acquisitions of radio (i.e., wireless)
communications are not covered unless they occur "under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy," circumstances that legislators expected would not cover, for
example, citizens band or ham radio transmissions.40
What also may not be obvious is that Congress understood the
coverage for "the contents of any wire communication to or from a
person in the United States" to include what is now commonly called
metadata, i.e., information identifying the calling and receiving
devices involved in a communication and indicating the length of that
communication. In identical language, the relevant committee reports
stated:
The surveillance covered by subparagraph (B) is not
limited to the acquisition of the oral, or verbal contents
of a wire communication. It includes the acquisition of
any other contents of the communication, for example,
where computerized data is transmitted by wire.
Therefore, it includes any form of "pen register" or
38Id. at § 101(f)(3), 92 Stat. 1785, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(f(3).
39 Id. at § 1o1(f)(1), 92 Stat. 1785, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18oi(f(i). The fourth
definition encompasses "the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than
from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes." Id. at § 1o1(f(4), 92 Stat. 1785, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(f)(4).
40 House FISA Report, supra note 6, at 52.
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"touch-tone decoder" device which is used to acquire,
from the contents of a wire communication, the
identities or locations of the parties to the
communication.41
Because the legislative history as well as the statutory language of
FISA was the subject of intense interbranch negotiation, it is
reasonable to expect that the Justice Department subsequently
interpreted FISA to permit pen register warrants as well.
II. BULK INFORMATION, ECPA AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT
The devices that capture information about communications one
initiates are called "pen registers."42 Devices that capture such
information about communications people receive are called "trap
and trace" devices.43 Despite FISA's tacit reference to "electronic
devices" used to capture information about communications apart
from their actual contents, it was not until eight years later that
Congress regulated the use of such devices comprehensively. Congress
regulated both pen registers and trap and trace devices under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which
prohibited the use of such devices except pursuant to either a FISA
41 House FISA Report, supra note 6, at 51; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, S.
REP. No. 95-701 at 35 (1978).
42 Under the Electronic Privacy Communication Act, "the term 'pen register' means a
device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include
the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or process
used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or
recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider
or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service
for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business." Pub. L.
No. 99-5o8, § 301(a), 1oo Stat. 1870 (1986), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
(Provisions of the ECPA that, as of 1986, were codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3125-3126 were
renumbered §§ 3126-3127 with the addition of a new § 3125 in 1988. Pub. L. No.1oo-69o, §
7092(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4410 (1988).)
43 Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, "the term 'trap and trace device'
means a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication,
provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication." Id., codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
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warrant or ECPA itself.44 Notably, however, the standard for obtaining
a pen register warrant under ECPA is arguably even less demanding
than the FISA standard. The applicant agency for such a warrant need
certify only "that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency."45
In 1998, Congress made explicit that FISA authorized pen register
and trap and trace warrants and expanded the scope of that authority.
Under Section 6ol of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, the government may get such a device based on:
information which demonstrates that there is reason to
believe that the telephone line to which the pen register
or trap and trace device is to be attached, or the
communication instrument or device to be covered by
the pen register or trap and trace device, has been or is
about to be used in communication with-
(A) an individual who is engaging or has engaged in
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities that involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States; or
(B) a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under
circumstances giving reason to believe that the
communication concerns or concerned international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities that
involve or may involve a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States.46
44 Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301(a), 1OO Stat. 1868 (1986), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
3121(a).
45 Id., at 1oo Stat. 1869, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(1).
46 Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396, 2405 (1998). The USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 214(a), 115 Stat. 286 (2001), deleted this language and substantially rewrote the
FISA provisions on pen registers and trap and trace devices. The current requirement is
only that "the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).
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The basis, however, for much of the NSA's bulk collection of
metadata arises under the so-called USA PATRIOT Act.47 That statute,
which substantially amended a dozen other laws regulating the
government's investigative authorities, was enacted under intense
executive branch pressure in the immediate wake of 9/11. In contrast
to the extensive interbranch negotiation and painstaking
documentation that accompanied FISA, Congress enacted the
PATRIOT Act less than two months after the September 11 attacks
and without carefully crafted analysis to guide its implementation.48
Among the key changes that expanded the government's
information gathering authority were an expansion of the definitions
of "pen register" and "trap and trace" devices. ECPA previously
authorized their use for telephone communications.49 They are now
defined to permit surveillance of routing information for all electronic
communications, including, for example, Web surfing and email.50
47 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271 (2001)
(hereinafter, the "USA PATRIOT Act" or "PATRIOT Act").
48 "Legislative proposals in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2oo were
introduced less than a week after the attacks. President Bush signed the final bill, the USA
PATRIOT Act, into law on October 26, 2001. Though the Act made significant
amendments to over 15 important statutes, it was introduced with great haste and passed
with little debate, and without a House, Senate, or conference report. As a result, it lacks
background legislative history that often retrospectively provides necessary statutory
interpretation." Electronic Privacy Information Center, USA PATRIOTAct, EPIC,
available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot.
49 Pub. L. No. 99-5o8, § 301(a), 1oo Stat. 1871 (1986).
5o Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 216(c)(2) and (3), 115 Stat. 288 (2001), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3127. Expanding the government's authority through a mere definitional change, however,
built into the law a potentially important ambiguity. Under ECPA, neither kind of device is
to be used to observe "the contents of any communication." 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). The
distinction between content and routing information is readily implemented with regard to
telephone communications. That distinction is far less obvious, however, for email. That is
because email communications move across a variety of conduits that use routing
information of different kinds. To oversimplify, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) needs
only two pieces of information to route an electronic message - the IP address of the
sending device and the address of the recipient server, which may belong, say, to Google,
Yahoo!, or the like. The ISP does not need to consult the "header" information that
indicates, for example, the actual intended recipient of the email. As far as the ISP is
concerned, the "header" is content. For Google, however, the header is routing
information. Google has to get its Gmail to the correct individual subscriber. Julian
Sanchez, Are Internet Backbone Pen Registers Constitutional?, JUSTSECURITY.ORG (Sept.
23, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2o13/o9/23/internet-backbone-pen-registers-
constitutional. In any event, we now know from redacted FISC opinions declassified and
released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that the FISC had to wrestle
seriously with the distinction between "content," the collection of which is not permitted
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Pen register authority was also extended so that its target need no
longer be a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power. Under
Section 214 of the Act, FISA was amended so that a pen register or
trap and trace device may be sought in connection with any
investigation "to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities."51 The only limitation regarding the use of such
devices targeting United States citizens is that "such investigation of a
United States person" may not be "conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution."52
Arguably, the most consequential change, however, appears to be
the enactment of Section 215 of the Act, which authorizes the FBI
Director or a designee to seek:
an order requiring the production of any tangible
things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items) for an investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities, provided that such investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution.53
The application for such authority need only "specify that the records
concerned are sought for an authorized investigation ... to protect
through pen register or trap and trace orders, and "dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information," which is permissible. See Undated Opinion by Judge John D. Bates
Declassified Without Date or Caption (FISC), at 30-35, 52-54, available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/i 118/CLEANEDPRTT%2o2.pdf (approving the re-
initiation of pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA for Internet metadata).
Although the opinion redacts all specifies about the precise categories of information NSA
proposes to collect as metadata, we know from another declassified opinion that
"information from the 'from' line of an email" is included. Undated Opinion by Judge
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly Declassified Without Date or Caption (FISC), at 15, available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRT%2o1.pdf. For further analysis
of problems lurking in the FISC's treatment of Internet metadata, see Julian Sanchez, The
FISC's Problematic PenlTrap Opinion on Bulk Internet Metadata Collection,
JUSTSECURITY.ORG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2o13/11/22/fises-slipshod-
pentrap-opinion-bulk-internet-metadata-collection.
51 The USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214(a), 115 Stat. 286 (2001), codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1842(C)(2).
52 Id.
53 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
186i(a).
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against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."54
As it turns out, the Bush and Obama Administrations have relied on
Section 215 to acquire telephone company records of the metadata
concerning millions and millions of phone calls.55 Because this
acquisition does not entail the government's use of an electronic
surveillance device, FISA does not apply.
III. THE 2005 NSA LEAKS
As expansive as these authorities may seem, it was revealed in a
series of New York Times articles in 2005 that the Bush
Administration, since shortly after 9/11, had been engaged in
extensive warrantless wiretapping outside the FISA process.56 The
Times also revealed in general terms the existence of a broad data
mining program.57 Unlike the 1975 New York Times revelations of
unlawful surveillance during the 196os, however, the 2005 revelations
prompted no comprehensive public inquiry or any establishment of a
clear historical record of what happened, why, and with whose
approval. It is important to take note of what we now know transpired
because the further 20o6 amendments to the PATRIOT Act58 and the
amendments to FISA that occurred in 200759 and 20o860 were
intended precisely to make lawful much of what had been of dubious
legality, at best, under the Bush Administration.
54 Id., codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2).
55 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/o6/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order.
56 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/i6program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o;
Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Eavesdropping Effort Began Soon After Sept. 11 Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=F7o716F73D54oC7B8DDDABo994DD4
04482; James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo5/12/21/politics/2insa.html.
57 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o.
58 See text at notes 97-8, infra.
59 See text at notes 101- 2, infra.
60 See text at notes 105-8, infra.
[Vol. 10:2
SHANE
The clearest, albeit still incomplete record of what we now know
concerning Bush Administration surveillance and the decision making
surrounding that surveillance comes from two documents. One is an
"Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program"
released on July 10, 2009,61 which was jointly prepared, as required
by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,62 by the Inspectors General of
Justice, Defense, the CIA, the NSA, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. The second is a draft March 24, 2oo9 report by
the NSA Office of Inspector General, which was leaked by Edward
Snowden.63 Events are perhaps easiest to follow if traced with regard
to particular categories of communications that NSA sought to
intercept: first, the contents of telephone and Internet
communications; second, telephone metadata; and third, Internet
metadata. All were part of what the IG Report calls the "President's
Surveillance Program" (PSP), which includes, but goes significantly
beyond the Terrorist Surveillance Program revealed in the 2005 New
York Times stories.
September 11, for obvious reasons, prompted NSA's interest in
substantially expanding its acquisition of telephony and Internet
content that might reveal foreign intelligence information. Thus, on
September 14, 2001, NSA Director General Michael Hayden
"approved the targeting of terrorist-associated foreign telephone
numbers on communication links between the United States and
foreign countries where terrorists were known to be operating."64 At
first, calls originating in the United States were collected only if
communicating with specified, pre-approved numbers, but this net
was expanded.65 By September 26, because al Qaeda's leadership was
in Afghanistan, General Hayden had determined that any Afghan
telephone number in contact with a U.S. telephone number "was
presumed to be of foreign intelligence value and could be
disseminated to the FBI."66
61 Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program (July 10, 2oo9), available
at https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf (hereinafter 2009 Unclassified PSP Report).
62 FISA Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301(c), 122 Stat. 2472 (2oo8).
63 Office of the Inspector General, National Security Agency Central Security Service, ST-
09-0002 Working Draft (Mar. 24, 2oo9), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/2o13o86/NSA%2olG%2oReport.pdf (hereinafter
NSA IG Report).
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During this period, General Hayden was apparently in discussions
with CIA Director George Tenet and the White House about the feared
inadequacy of existing legal authorities to permit the kinds of
expanded acquisition that could be useful in the wake of September
11.67 As a consequence, President Bush, on October 4, 2011, issued a
secret memorandum entitled, "Authorization for Specified Electronic
Surveillance Activities During a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent
Acts of Terrorism Within the United States." 68 As summarized in the
Draft NSA IG Report, under the President's order:
NSA could collect the content and associated
metadata of telephony and Internet communications
for which there was probable cause to believe that
one of the communicants was in Afghanistan or that
one. communicant was engaged in or preparing for
acts of international terrorism. In addition, NSA was
authorized to acquire telephony and Internet
metadata for communications with at least one
communicant outside the United States or for which
no communicant was known to be a citizen of the
United States. NSA was also allowed to retain,
process, analyze and disseminate intelligence from
the communications acquired under the authority. 69
This authorization was subsequently modified from time-to-time
depending, one presumes, on the White House's assessment of the
scope of national security needs.70
With regard to both telephony and Internet content, the
acquisition permitted by the Bush order went beyond FISA in a
number of respects. For example, certain communications originating
or received in the United States might be intercepted without warrant
even though they were unambiguously covered by the FISA definition
of "electronic surveillance."71 The NSA could collect in the United
States Internet content for foreign communications that simply
67 Id. at 4, 6-7.
68 Id. at 1.
69 id. at 8.
70 Id.
71 See text at notes 37-40, supra.
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"transited" U.S. electronic networks;72 thus, communications between
foreign nationals might be intercepted in the United States if they
were using an email service that resides on U.S. territory, even if the
interception also captured content involving U.S. "communicants"
having a reasonable expectation of privacy.
After the warrantless surveillance of electronic communications
content was divulged in The New York Times, President Bush
acknowledged in a December 17, 2005 radio address what the
Administration called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).73 In
addition, the Administration prepared two public presentations of its
legal position. The more extensive of these was a January 19, 20o6
Justice Department memorandum of unattributed authorship,
entitled, "Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President."74 In this memorandum,
72 FISA encompasses as "electronic surveillance": "the installation or use of an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes." 50 U.S.C. § 18o1(f(4). Internet traffic does not count as
"wire... communication" because FISA defines "wire communication" as "any
communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished
or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications." 50 U.S.C. §
18oi(l). Because Internet service providers do not operate as "common carriers" in the
provision of Internet service, the installation of an interception device in the United States
for acquiring information from Internet providers that captures information that would be
protected by the Fourth Amendment from warrantless seizure, is covered by this
definition.
This is not the only respect in which the NSA was likely concerned that FISA had not
kept up with technological change in the global communications system. Consider, for
example, the migration of foreign and trans-border communications from satellite
transmission (where they could be plucked out of the air by NSA without implicating FISA)
to undersea fiber optic cables (on which communications potentially implicate FISA). On
the history of tapping such cables, see Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice
of Undersea Cable Tapping, THEATLANTIC.COM (July 16, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepy-long-standing-
practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855.
73 President George W. Bush, "President's Radio Address," 2005 WL 3450560 (Dec. 17,
2005), summarized in JEFFREYW. SEIFERT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEACH SERVICE, DATA
MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 23-24 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf.
74 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2oo6), reprinted in David Cole and
Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency's Domestic Spying Program:
Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L. REV. 1355, 1374 (2006) (hereinafter, "NSA Legal
Authorities").
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as in an earlier letter from Assistant Attorney General William
Moscella to the leadership of the House and Senate Select Committees
on Intelligence,75 the Administration's legal stance rested to two
essential propositions. The first is that warrantless electronic
surveillance directed at al Qaeda and its supporters fell within the
President's inherent war powers, as confirmed by the Authorization to
Use Military Force in Afghanistan, or the AUMF,76 enacted by
Congress on September 12, 2OO1.77 The second was that the President
has inherent constitutional power to conduct the TSP no matter what
the AUMF says, and, if FISA is read to preclude this particular
program of foreign intelligence surveillance, then FISA is
unconstitutional.78
Although both propositions were highly problematic-the Office of
Legal Counsel subsequently repudiated several aspects of its earlier
legal memoranda that were the basis of this legal defense79-one could
imagine at least a coherent argument on behalf of programs limited to
targeting communications to and from persons reasonably believed to
be acting in Afghanistan or on behalf of al Qaeda. That defense,
however, would be yet more dubious if extended to the NSA's
metadata programs, which clearly and foreseeably reached millions of
communications with no Afghanistan or al Qaeda connection.
Although the New York Times stories, among others, did indicate in
2005 some sort of undisclosed NSA data mining program,8o the Bush
75 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Affairs,
U.S. Department of Justice to the Leadership of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005),
reprinted in Cole and Lederman, supra note 75, at 1360.
76 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 15 Stat. 224 (2001) (hereinafter, "AUMF").
77 NSA Legal Authorities, supra note 75, at 1379-90.
78 Id. at 1407.
79 Memorandum for the Files by Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memostatusolcopinionso152009.pdf; see also
PETER M. SHANE AND HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 718-719 (3d ed. 2011).
80 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, supra note 58.
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Administration's disclosures did not address its collection of
metadata. 81
The collection of telephony metadata gave the NSA information
regarding the originating numbers and numbers called, as well as call
duration, for apparently every telephone call made over the networks
of cooperating telephone companies. 82 No requirement was imposed
that limitations were imposed regarding the location of callers or
participation of non-U.S. persons because the NSA did not acquire
this information through government electronic surveillance. 83 This
information is regularly collected by telephone companies for their
own business purposes and was requested pursuant to the PATRIOT
Act Section 215's authority for the acquisition of "tangible things,"
namely, business records.8 4 As reported by the IG: "NSA determined
that under the [2011 Presidential] Authorization it could gain access
to approximately 81% of the international calls into and out of the
United States through three corporate partners."8 5
Such metadata were then available to the NSA for what it called
"contact chaining." As explained in the IG Report: "Contact chaining
is the process of building a network graph that models the
communication (e-mail, telephony, etc.) patterns of targeted entities
(people, organizations, etc.) and their associates from the
communications sent or received by the targets."8 6 Furthermore:
Additional chaining can be performed on the
associates' contacts to determine patterns in the way a
81 An electronic search of the Bush Administration's documents discussing the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, cited in notes 75 and 76, supra, confirms that neither documents
use the words "metadata" or "Internet."
82 Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act, at 3 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf.
83 See, e.g., In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR-138o, at 4 (FISC, Apr.
25, 2013) (ordering respondent to produce "all call detail records or 'telephony metadata'
created by-for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly
within the United States, including local telephone calls."), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2o13/o7/215-order.pdf.
84 Pub. L. No.107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1861(a).
85 NSA IG Report, supra note 64, at 27.
86 Id. at 13.
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network of targets may communicate. Additional
degrees of separation from the initial target are
referred to as "hops." For example a direct contact is
one hop away from the target. A contact of the direct
contact would be described as being 2 hops away from
the target. The resulting contact-graph is subsequently
analyzed for intelligence and to develop potential
investigative leads.8 7
Analysts would do contact chaining on the U.S. numbers to
determine, for example, which numbers were linked to foreign
numbers. As the IG recounts: "The records were used by NSA
Counter-Terrorism metadata analysts to perform call chaining and
network reconstruction between known al Qaeda and al Qaeda-
affiliate telephone numbers and previously unknown telephone
numbers with which they had been in contact."88
Until March, 2004, telephone companies were also providing the
NSA metadata concerning Internet communications.8 9 In March,
2004, however, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel,
under new leadership, determined that the collection of Internet
metadata could not be squared with either FISA or the PATRIOT
Act. 90 Although no memorandum of its advice has been made public,
two propositions probably led to this conclusion.91 First, because
Internet metadata are not routinely kept by the cooperating
companies, its acquisition would not fit under Section 215; collecting
the metadata would amount to electronic surveillance. Second,
because there was likely no way to exclude the collection of metadata
regarding millions of emails from U.S. communicants, their bulk
acquisition plainly violated the terms of FISA. In a much-publicized
and dramatic episode, Attorney General Ashcroft, lying in a hospital
bed, refused to sign off on President Bush's March 11, 2004
871d. at 13 n. 6.
88 Id. at 33.
89 Id. at 8, 32, 38.
90 Id. at 38.
91 Julian Sanchez, What the Asheroft "Hospital Showdown" on NSA spying was all about:
How the government sought to justify blanket collection of Internet metadata,




authorization for Internet metadata collection.92 The NSA initially
continued the interception anyway, based on approval by White
House Counsel, rather than the Attorney General.93 On March 26,
2004, however, President Bush temporarily discontinued the
authorization for bulk Internet metadata collection.94
IV. PATRIOT ACT AMENDMENTS OF 2006, THE PROTECT AMERICA
ACT AND THE FISA AMENDMENTS OF 1978
As noted above, President Bush's acknowledgement of NSA
warrantless content collection programs did not precipitate anything
like the extended public discussion and systematic congressional
investigations that preceded the enactment of FISA-or that is
occurring now in the wake of the Snowden leaks. Instead, the
Administration proceeded to consult with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to develop rationales under which programs first
developed under President Bush's 2001 order could be legitimated
instead by orders of the FISC.
The first of these transitions actually occurred with regard to the
Internet metadata program that had been suspended in March, 2004.
By July, 2004, the Administration was able to secure from the FISC a
"pen register/trap and trace" order to permit the Internet metadata
collection: "[T]he order essentially gave NSA the same authority to
collect bulk Internet metadata that it had under the PSP, except that
it specified the datalinks from which NSA could collect, and it
limited the number of people that could access the data."95
92 Daniel Klaidman, Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6,
2oo6, at 34. Although the Newsweek article was the first to reveal the fact of a hospital
pilgrimage, its full details later emerged through testimony by former Deputy Attorney
General Comey to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Testimony of James B. Comey, Former
DeputyAttorney General, U.S. Department of Justice to the Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearing on Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice
Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys? -Part IV, U.S. Senate, 110 th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2oo6), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/o5/15/AR2007o515olo43.html.
93 NSA IG Report, supra note 64, at 38.
94 Id. at 32.
95 Id. at 39. Although released in a form that redacted the date of issuance, the Undated
Opinion by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly Declassified Without Date or Caption (FISC),
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTf%201.pdf, reads
as if it represents the original order. There are arguably three quite uncomfortable features
of Judge Kollar- Kotelly's analysis. First, the pen register/trap and trace provisions of FISA,
speak of applications to authorize "a pen register or trap and trace device," § 50 U.S.C.
1842(a)(1) (emphasis added), which might well suggest that Congress did not intend to
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As for telephony metadata, NSA acquisition was pursued under
PATRIOT Act Section 215. On March 9, 2006, Congress enacted the
"USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,"
which amended Section 215 to require only that the "records [pursued
under that section] are sought for an authorized investigation ... to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities."96 A FISC Order covering telephone metadata
was instituted in May, 20o6, producing no reduction in metadata
acquisition, limiting only who could access the data and requiring
somewhat more stringent oversight.97
The orders covering telephone and Internet content proved more
complex because of the large volume of telephone numbers and email
addresses-"selectors," in NSA parlance-that the NSA wanted to
include. With regard to foreign "selectors," the NSA and Justice
attempted to solve this problem in 2007 by changing "the traditional
F ISA definition of a 'facility' [to be targeted] as a specific
telephone number or email address . .. to encompass the gateway
or cable head that foreign targets use for communications."98 Even
this move, however, significantly reduced the number of target
addresses available to the NSA. The documentation that the FISC
demanded to justify the inclusion of specific selectors reduced the
authorize FISA to permit bulk acquisition of Internet (or any other) metadata under a
single FISC order covering multiple devices. Second, although the court acknowledges that
the vast majority of captured metadata will not be related to terrorism or foreign
intelligence, id. at 48, Judge Kollar-Kotelly finds that the information sought is "relevant to
an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities," as FISA requires, § 50 U.S.C. 1842(c)(2), apparently because the
metadata search is not too broad to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirements - a seeming non sequitur. Id. at 50. Finally, the judge's order contains a
series of requirements for the storage, accessing and dissemination of the acquired
metadata, even though § 50 U.S.C. 1842 makes no provision for the judicial imposition of
such conditions. Orin Kerr, Problems with the FISC's Newly-Declassified Opinion on Bulk
Collection ofInternetMetadata, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o13/11/problems-with-the-fiscs-newly-declassified-
opinion-on-bulk-collection-of-internet -metadata.
96 Pub. L. No.107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
97 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the




98 NSA IG Report, supra note 64, at 41.
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number of foreign addresses available from 11,000 to 3,000 and the
number of domestic addresses to essentially just one. 99
The unworkability of the FISC orders, especially for content, led
the Administration in 2007 to seek amendments to FISA. Congress's
initial, short-term solution was the Protect America Act of 2007.100
The PAA:
authorized the Director of National Intelligence and
the Attorney General to acquire foreign intelligence
information concerning persons outside the United
States for one year, if the acquisition involved the
assistance of a communication service provider,
custodian or other person, and a significant purpose of
the collection was the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information. The Act was set to sunset after 18o days,
on February 1, 2oo8.101
The PAA was highly controversial in a number of respects. For those
skeptical of the TSP, the Act seemed to go too far in relaxing judicial
oversight of electronic surveillance and creating loopholes through
which warrantless surveillance might be directed at persons within
the United States.102
Congress ultimately replaced the PAA with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments of 20o8.103 The
Amendments accomplished a number of key things. Among its more
controversial sections, it provided a path to immunity from liability
for telecommunications companies that may have violated FISA by
cooperating with Bush Administration surveillance programs between
2001 and 2007.104 Even more important for the future, however,
Section 702 of the Amendments added a new title to FISA providing
99 Id. at 41-42.
loo Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 7 (2007).
101 S. REP.110-209 at 6 (2007).
lo2 See, e.g., ACLUFact Sheet on the "Police America Act,"ACLU.ORG (Aug. 7, 2007),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-fact-sheet-%E2%8o%9Cpolice-america-act.
103 Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
104 Id. at Title II, 122 Stat. 2467, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1885a-1885c. For analysis, see
Edward C. Liu, Retroactive Immunity Provided by the FISA Amendments Act of 2oo8
(Congressional Research Service, July 25, 2oo8), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL346oo.pdf.
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so-called, "Additional Procedures for Targeting Communications of
Certain Persons Outside the United States,"105 which were to remain
in effect until December 31, 2012, but which have since been
extended.1o 6 When a targeted individual is reasonably believed to be
outside the United States, the Attorney General may apply for an
order approving the acquisition from that person of foreign
intelligence information under conditions slightly more relaxed than
those specified by 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1805. For example, if the
targeted person is "an officer or employee" of a foreign power, they
need not themselves be a "foreign power," or an "agent of a foreign
power."107 Alternatively, when a targeted person is reasonably
believed to be outside the United States, but the Attorney General
wishes to conduct electronic surveillance of the target, or to acquire
the target's stored electronic data or communications, within the
United States, the Attorney General may seek an order from the FISC
that not only approves the acquisition in question, but compels the
cooperation of private "electronic communication service providers"
in the acquisition.1oS
The most dramatic new procedures, however, categorically allow
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to
institute legally authorized programs of surveillance of up to one year
"of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States."109 Such programs do not require that targeted individuals be
named to the FISC, but only that the Attorney General and the DNI
certify that procedures are in place that are reasonably designed to
limit surveillance to persons in general who are reasonably believed to
be outside the United States, and that would prevent the intentional
acquisition of communications among persons all of whom are known
to be inside the United States.11o It is required also that minimization
procedures be in place"' and that "a significant purpose" of the
105 Id. Title I, at 122 Stat. 2437 (2008), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ i88i-1881g.
106 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126 Stat. 1631 (2oo8).
10750 U.S.C. § 1881c.
108 50 U.S.C. § 188ib.
10950 U.S.C. § 1881a.
110 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g).
11150 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)(1).
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acquisition be obtaining foreign intelligence information.112 The
Attorney General and DNI may jointly initiate such acquisitions even
without judicial certification if they jointly determine "that exigent
circumstances exist because, without immediate implementation of an
authorization.., intelligence important to the national security of the
United States may be lost or not timely acquired and time does not
permit the issuance" of a judicial order.113 These procedures
essentially eliminate the documentation complexities that made the
FISC's 2007 orders on content acquisition impracticable from NSA's
point of view. The new Section 702 also appears to eliminate the
statutory barrier to the collection of Internet metadata. Yet the Obama
Administration reportedly shut down the program, for unspecified
reasons, in 2011.114
V. THE SNOWDEN REVELATIONS ABOUT INFORMATION COLLECTION
AND STATUTORY UNCERTAINTY: SEGUE TO A SYMPOSIUM
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian published the first of a stream of
explosive news stories about NSA surveillance based on documents
leaked by Edward Snowden, an employee of NSA contractor Booz
Allen Hamilton.115 The first document to be disclosed was a secret
FISC order compelling a Verizon subsidiary to turn over call details
for every domestic and international phone call placed on its network
during a three-month period.116 The order made clear for the first time
that the NSA was tracking metadata on the telephone
communications of millions of Americans, not just suspected agents
of a foreign power or terrorists.
11250 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(v).
11350 U.S.C. § 1881a(C)(2).
114 Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman, NSA Collected US Email Records in Bulk for
More Than Two Years Under Obama, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/27/nsa-data-mining-authorised-obama.
115 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/o6/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order.
ni6 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. on BEHALF
of MCI Communication Services, Inc. D/B/AVerizon Business Services, BR 13-8o (FISC,
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A story published the next day revealed the existence of a
computer system called PRISM, which-according to a set of leaked
training slides-allows the Government to analyze information it
collects from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube,
Skype, AOL, and Apple.117 This material includes "search history, the
content of emails, file transfers and live chats."11S
The disclosure of these two programs involving the massive
collection of both telephony metadata and online communications set
the stage for what has been an extraordinary string of disclosures'19-
some in the press, some through government declassification-that
have shed unprecedented light on the workings of our foreign
intelligence surveillance regime. Among the document leaks are:
* NSA documents describing its "mission
capabilities" based on the collection of
metadata;
* FISC documents concerning NSA targeting and
minimization procedures;
* Justice Department briefings to congressional
committees concerning the nature of NSA
collection programs;
* NSA documents concerning programs for
collecting Internet and telephony data from
fiber-optic cable networks;
* NSA documents on strategies to defeat
encryption; and
117 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of
Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), available at
http://vww.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/o6/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
118 PRISM/US-984XN Overview OR The SJGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting - Overview,
Slide 3, available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/2o13o816/PRISM%2oOverview%2oPowerpoint%
2oSlides.pdf.
119 My summaries of the kinds of documents either leaked or declassified is derived from
the ACLU's online library of NSA Documents Released to the Public Since June 2013,
ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013. Summaries
of key documents may also be found on LAWFARE, http://wwv.lawfareblog.com.
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* NSA documents revealing compliance problems
in the implementation of collection programs
subject to FISC orders.
For its part, the Government has produced or released declassified
versions of an even larger number of documents. These include:
* correspondence with and testimony to Congress
concerning the programs at issue, reflecting the
system of congressional oversight;
* an Administration white paper on the bulk
collection of telephony metadata under Section
215 of the PATRIOT Act;
* FISC opinions reviewing the NSA's bulk data
collection programs; and
* reports on the NSA's compliance with the
FISC's Section 702 guidelines and minimization
procedures;
Even in severely redacted form, the FISC opinions are especially
intriguing. They display a court typically deferential to the Justice
Department's statutory and constitutional arguments, but intensely
engaged in the crafting and monitoring of the targeting and
minimization requirements the court imposes under FISA. We learn
that, at least in one instance, the court found aspects of the NSA's
"upstream collection" of Internet transactions including multiple
communications to be unlawful.120
Unsurprisingly given the magnitude of the programs now under
scrutiny, the public's incomplete access to the assessments that drive
these programs, and the extraordinary density of the documents to
which we now have access, reactions to the Snowden revelations have
differed markedly. Benjamin Wittes, a Brookings Institution senior
fellow and editor-in-chief of the exceptional Lawfare blog, has written
a generally sanguine assessment:
[N]othing in the current disclosures should cause us to
lose faith in the essential integrity of the post-
120 [Redacted Caption], at 67-79 (FISC, Oct. 3, 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/fisc-opinion-io.3.2011.pdf.
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Watergate system of delegated intelligence oversight.
To the contrary, those disclosures should give the
public great confidence both in the oversight
mechanisms within the executive branch and in the
judicial oversight mechanisms that review both the
Section 215 collection program and the Section 702
collection program.
The disclosures show no evidence of any intentional,
unlawful spying on Americans or abuses of civil
liberties. They show a low rate of the sort of errors any
complex system of technical collection will inevitably
yield. They show robust compliance procedures. They
show earnest and serious efforts to keep the Congress
informed-including members not on this committee
or its counterpart in the House of Representatives. And
they show an ongoing dialogue with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) about the
parameters of the agency's legal authorities and a
commitment both to keeping the court informed of
activities and to complying with its judgments as to
their legality. The FISC, meanwhile, in these
documents looks nothing like the rubber stamp that it
is portrayed to be in countless caricatures. It looks,
rather, like a judicial institution of considerable energy,
one whose oversight role with respect to both Section
215 and Section 702 requires enormous time and
energy on the part of the executive to satisfy.121
It is not hard to find less positive views. Jennifer Granick, director
of civil liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society and
law professor Christopher Jon Sprigman, describe the NSA
surveillance program as "criminal":
The [NSA's bulk data] programs violate both the letter
and the spirit of federal law. No statute explicitly
authorizes mass surveillance. Through a series of legal
121 Prepared Statement of Benjamin Wittes Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Legislative Changes to the Foreign





contortions, the Obama administration has argued that
Congress, since 9/11, intended to implicitly authorize
mass surveillance. But this strategy mostly consists of
wordplay, fear-mongering and a highly selective
reading of the law.122
Law professor Martin Lederman, a former Obama Justice Department
official, offers a mixed assessment of the FISC:
The disclosures . . . have demonstrated, I think, that
the FISC is extremely resolute, and careful, about
ensuring that the NSA and FBI comply with the terms
of the FISC's own orders, including the so-called
"minimization" requirements-in part because the
lawyers in ... DOJ's National Security Division, take
very seriously their responsibility to bring to the court's
attention any compliance problems. When it comes to
the more fundamental legal questions about the proper
statutory and constitutional scope of a proposed
program, however, the FISC process is not nearly as
thorough or reliable, in large measure because the
court hears from only one side.123
The aim of this symposium is to advance our national assessment
of the NSA by looking at four key questions: the programs' legality,
their contribution to national security, their impact on civil liberties,
and possible avenues for constructive change. Professor John Yoo,
whose defense of the Bush Administration surveillance programs
proved controversial,124 concludes that the programs revealed by the
122 Jennifer Stisa Granick and Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Criminal N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.Com/2013/o6/28/opinion/the-
criminal-nsa.html?_r=o.
123 Marty Lederman, The Kris Paper, and the Problematic FISC Opinion on the Section 215
"Metadata" Collection Program, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2013, updated Oct. 14, 2013),
available at http://justsecurity.org/2013/1o/o1/kris-paper-legality-section-215 -metadata-
collection.
124 The 2009 Unclassified PSP Report, supra note 62, criticizes Professor Yoo's legal
opinions for giving insufficient weight to several provisions of FISA that would have
appeared problematic for his conclusions, for failing to discuss Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), as it might bear on his analysis, and for inaccuracies in
his memos' descriptions of the activities being reviewed. Id. at 10-14. It perhaps ought to
be said, especially in the context of this symposium, that the constitutional analysis
undergirding Professor Yoo's confidential professional advice is fully revealed in his
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Snowdon leaks are both constitutional and statutorily authorized.125
Specifically, he finds that the metadata records acquired under
Section 215 are "tangible things . . . relevant to an authorized
investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to ... protect against international
terrorism," and thus clearly within purview of the statute.126 The
content collection programs under Section 702, because they target
non-U.S. persons believed to be outside the U.S., likewise fall within
the bounds of explicit statutory authority.127
Of the two statutory arguments, the Section 215 argument is
clearly the more vulnerable-despite its acceptance by the FISC. As
others have noted, "most of the information collected does not relate
to individuals suspected of any wrongdoing."128 The metadata can be
viewed as relevant only under a needle-in-the-haystack theory-
namely, that the likely existence of some modicum of specifically
relevant data in the bulk collection makes all the records relevant
because, at the moment of collection, it is impossible to be any more
specific about what that modicum may be. This would seem to
eliminate entirely the distinction between relevant and irrelevant
records.29
Also, the use of Section 215 to elicit bulk metadata from
telecommunications companies seems to run afoul of the strict
statutory limits on the permissible disclosure to the government of
telecommunication subscriber records.130 18 U.S.C. §2702(a) forbids
academic writings both before and after his period of government service; he does not shy
away from exposing his views to public critique.
125 John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency's Bulk Data Surveillance
Programs, 10 ISJLP 324-326 (2014).
126 Id. at 305.
127Id. at 311-313.
128 Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, at 50 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.fm?abstract id=2344774.
129 For a detailed critical analysis of the Government's Section 215 argument, see id. at 48-
64. For a comprehensive review of the interpretive issues raised under Section 215, see
David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES
No. 4 (2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2 013/o9/Lawfare- Research-Paper- Series-No. -4-2.pdf. The
Administration's official defense of its position appears as Administration White Paper:
Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, at 3
(Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf.
130 Donohue, supra note 129, at 63-64; Lederman, supra note 124.
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"a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication
service to the public [to] knowingly divulge a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service.
. . to any governmental entity." Section 2702(c) includes a number of
exemptions to this prohibition, but none covers the blanket provision
of business records.131 The prohibition in §2702(a) was added by §
212(a)(1)(B) of the PATRIOT Act, the same statute that created the
Section 215 "tangible things" authority.132 The omission of a Section
215 exception to the Section 212 prohibition hardly seems like an
oversight.33
131 A provider described in subsection (a) may divulge the contents of a communication-
(i) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such
addressee or intended recipient;
(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511 (2)(a), or 2703 of this title;
(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of
such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;
(4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such
communication to its destination;
(5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of
the rights or property of the provider of that service;
(6) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in connection with a
report submitted thereto under section 2258A;
(7) to a law enforcement agency-
(A) if the contents-
(i) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and
(ii) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime; or
[(B) Repealed. Pub. L. io8-21, title V, § 5o8(b)(i)(A),Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 684]
(8) to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure
without delay of communications relating to the emergency.
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
132 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 284 (2001).
133 The FISC's handling of this issue seems flatly to ignore the plain statutory language. In
re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental Opinion, BR o8-13,
at 3 (FISC, Mar. 2, 2oo9), available at
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Much of the consternation bestirred by this statutory uncertainty
has been devoted to the degree that the FISC's acquiescence in the
Administration's arguments on behalf of Section 215 authority may
reveal the weakness of a system of judicial oversight in which the
surveillance target or his or her advocate never appear. 134 Targets
become aware of their surveillance-and able to challenge it-only if
subsequent criminal prosecution occurs and the government reveals
the surveillance as a source of evidence against the defendant.135 The
possibility that the Government has systematically violated Congress's
precise delimitation of its bulk acquisition authority has perhaps
stirred less outrage than it otherwise might on the assumption that-
with the Snowden revelations now before us-Congress will eventually
determine yet more definitively whether bulk metadata collection of
the kind so far undertaken should or should not be lawful.
The prospects for legislative reform, however, are presumably
contingent also on the kinds of surveillance that the Constitution
permits. Professor Yoo argues that the programs so far revealed pass
Fourth Amendment muster either because the information acquired
or the targets of investigation are beyond Fourth Amendment
protection, and the searches embodied in these programs pass the test
of reasonableness.13 6 Like the Administration, Professor Yoo relies, in
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub DeC%2o1%202oo8%2oSupplemental
%2oOpinions%2ofrom%2othe%2oFISC.pdf. As summarized by Professor Lederman:
"Judge Walton's analysis relied entirely on the fact that, under one of the exceptions to
section 2702(c), the FBI can issue a 'national security letter' (NSL) to an electronic
communications service provider, requesting that it disclose a customer's call records,
without the approval or involvement of the FISC." See 18 U.S.C. § 2709. Judge Walton
reasoned that it "would have been 'anomalous' for Congress to permit the Bureau to obtain
such records from providers with a simple letter signed by an FBI official, but to have
prohibited the FBI from obtaining the same metadata with FISC approval and the
oversight and minimization requirements prescribed by section 215." Lederman, supra
note 124. The obvious problem with this analysis, as both Professors Lederman and
Donohue note, Donohue, supra note 129, at 63-64, is that, however "anomalous" the
statutory language may be, Judge Walton's analysis adds an additional exception to 18
U.S.C. § 2702(c) that flies in the face of its terms and is nowhere supported by legislative
history.
134 See Lederman, supra note 124.
135 The Justice Department is currently conducting a review of all criminal cases in which
the government has used evidence gathered pursuant to FISA and maybe notifying
defendants in some of those cases that they were subjected to warrantless surveillance. Sari
Horwitz, Justice Is Reviewing Criminal Cases That Used Surveillance Evidence Gathered
Under FISA, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-reviewing-criminal-
cases -that-used-evidence-gathered-under-fisa- act/2o 13/11/15/oaea642o -4eod- 1e3-
989o-aleo997fboco_story.html.
136 Yoo, supra note 3, at 301-326.
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his Fourth Amendment defense of the metadata collection, on Smith
v. Maryland,137 which held that the government did not need a
warrant to track phone numbers because, in using telephone
networks, callers voluntarily disclosed their numbers to a third party-
namely, the phone company-thus eliminating the expectation of
privacy. If Smith is fully applicable to the Section 215 orders, the
Fourth Amendment issue does seem to have been decided in the
Government's favor. Commentators who dissent rely chiefly on the
concurring opinions of five Justices in the Supreme Court's recent
decision forbidding the warrantless attachment of GPS tracking
devices on private automobiles which indicated their openness to
rethinking whether Smith ought to apply to searches for aggregate
data.138 So far, however, the Government's Fourth Amendment case
seems plausibly grounded in precedent.
Professor Katherine Strandburg argues, however, that the
programs Snowden revealed violate constitutional rights in other
respects. Specifically, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of
Association's Specificity Requirement39 argues that metadata
surveillance is unconstitutional unless conducted in compliance with
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association. As
analyzed by Professor Strandburg, that right entails certain specificity
requirements that the current Section 215 programs do not meet.
For many Americans, the wisdom or imprudence of the NSA
programs will depend less on legal argument and more on what NSA
surveillance contributes to or detracts from national security and civil
liberties. Mark D. Young, who served as a Senior Advisor in the
United States Cyber Command Directorate for Plans and Policy-and
who was formerly Special Counsel for Defense Intelligence for the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence-argues that the
Snowden leaks have compromised U.S. national security in four areas:
facilitating operational adjustments in the techniques and security
practices of our adversaries; complicating U.S. foreign relations;
impairing important cooperation between the U.S. government and
private industry; and unjustifiably reducing public confidence in the
National Security Agency, with likely negative impacts on its resources
and authorities.140 Although his essay does not attempt to detail the
137 442 US 735 (1979).
138 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 954 (2n12) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957
(Alito, J., concurring).
139 10 ISJLP 327-365 (2014).
140 Mark D. Young, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of Classified
Information, 1o ISJLP 367-4o6 (2014).
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specific ways in which NSA surveillance has been valuable for
protecting national security, he credits the positive representations in
this regard of those most closely involved with NSA's programs, as
well as what he takes to be their underlying logic.
For their part, however, political scientist John Mueller and
engineer Mark G. Stewart seriously question both the need for secrecy
and whether the metadata program, in particular, is truly justified on
a national security basis.141 Their review of the program's claimed
successes lead them to conclude that the program "would very likely
fail a full cost-benefit analysis handily even without taking into
consideration privacy and civil liberties concerns."142
The debate over civil liberties might well seem one-sided-
surveillance would not seem to offer any immediate civil liberties
advantages-although proponents of NSA surveillance may assert that
surveillance serves the cause of civil liberties in an indirect, but
important way. It could be argued, if the programs help the
government to fend off terrorist attack, they necessarily help to
promote an atmosphere of public calm that is more conducive to
respect for civil liberties. Speaking of even the limited oversight
provided by the FISC, David Addington, Vice President Cheney's Chief
of Staff, predicted: "We're just one bomb away from getting rid of that
obnoxious court."43 Even though Mr. Addington's words may have
created what one hopes is the inadvertent impression that he would
have welcomed that attack, our history after 9/11 reinforces the
fundamental point that the public is more vigilant about its civil
liberties when it feels safe. The argument, in short, is that without
security, there is no liberty.
For civil libertarians, however, any such argument is quite likely to
pale given the more direct civil liberties impacts of mass surveillance.
In NSA Surveillance: The Implications for Civil Liberties, Shayana
Kadidal, the senior managing attorney of the Guantfinamo Global
Justice Initiative at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York
City, asserts that such programs threaten the very independence of
citizen thought and action that are central to democratic
governance.1 44 He illustrates that idea concretely by explaining the
141 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Secret without Reason and Costly without
Accomplishment: Questioning the NSA's Metadata Program, 1o ISJLP 407-432 (2014).
142 Id. at 430-431.
143 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 181 (2007).
144 10 ISJLP 433-479 (2014).
[Vol. 10:2
SHANE
impact of the NSA programs on his own work and on the work of
other lawyers who represent politically unpopular or vulnerable
clients. Like Professors Mueller and Stewart, he also calls into
question the "liberty-security tradeoff' meme. Like them, he calls into
question the few successes publicly identified with the NSA programs
and worries, as they do, that the extraordinary rate of false positives
means that the FBI is too often spending significant time and effort on
leads that go nowhere.145
Bryce Newell, who is both an attorney and a doctoral student in
information science, places the civil liberties question in a more
theoretical frame.146 Taking what he calls a "neo-republican" stance on
the nature of liberty-namely, that liberty manifests itself in the ability
of a people to self-govern, by reducing domination and the arbitrary
exercise of power-Newell argues that surveillance is not necessarily
inimical to liberty per se. Its legitimacy, however, requires that it be
exercised for the public good and that the public have meaningful
opportunities to challenge the secrecy in government that may
prevent people from exercising genuine democratic oversight and
control over their political representatives. He finds that idea honored
more robustly in relevant decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights than in U.S. courts, whose resistance to secrecy challenges he
criticizes.
Given serious concerns from multiple angles that the Snowden
leaks and accompanying document declassification have evoked, the
issue is finally imposed: how might matters be improved? In the fall of
2013, President Obama convened a review group of academics and
former intelligence officials to advise him on reform. Their efforts
yielded 46 suggestions,47 some of which the President has adopted.4 8
These ideas, however, have hardly exhausted the need for further
thinking.
145 Id. at 469-471.
146 Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 1o ISJLP 481-522 (2014).
147 PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES,
LIBERTYAND SECURITY INA CHANGING WORLD (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/213- 12- 12rg-final-report.pdf.
148 Transcript Of President Obama's Speech On NSA Reforms, NPR.ORG (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolities/2014/01/17/26348o199/transeript-of-president-
obamas-speech-on-nsa-reforms; Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy: The Three Ambitious
NSA Reforms Endorsed by Obama, and the One He Rejected, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and polities/war-stories/2014/0/obama s nsa r
eforms the president s proposals for metadata and the fisa.html.
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Professor Nathan Sales, whose government service most recently
includes a stint as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development
in the Bush Department of Homeland Security, advocates the
establishment of what he calls baseline rules for conducting
"programmatic surveillance."149 More than a number of other authors
in this volume, he credits the value of such surveillance and thinks it
unlikely to disappear. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that he
believes the NSA, as currently operating, already respects-though
perhaps imperfectly-a number of the baseline principles he identifies.
He does advocate that metadata surveillance be continued on the
basis of clearer and more explicit statutory authority in order to
maximize the potential for both effective congressional and judicial
oversight. He would also like to see debates over the adoption of such
programs become more transparent to the public and better informed.
Perhaps his most innovative suggestion is the application to the NSA
programs of the insight that internal bureaucratic controls might
partially substitute for external judicial and congressional constraints
as mechanisms for advancing privacy and civil liberties values.150
Professor Stephen Vladeck-although perhaps less sanguine about
programmatic surveillance than Professor Sales-takes a cautionary
stance on the potential for intensifying judicial review.51 Post-9/11
litigation has been severely hamstrung by a combination of standing
problems and the state secrets doctrine. Even if Congress enacted a
workaround for the standing, it is not clear how routinely plaintiffs
could challenge NSA programs absent a steady stream of further
leaks. Proposals to make FISC hearings more adversarial hold more
promise, but it remains unclear whether Article III would permit a
designated advocate to appeal FISC orders to a higher court or
whether it is possible to conduct an effectively adversarial system
consistent with the level of secrecy that a system of foreign
intelligence surveillance might well require.
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt takes a rather different tack. 152
No doubt reflecting his knowledge as a former telecommunications
regulator, Mr. Hundt is careful to cast what most are calling NSA
surveillance as a collaborative project between government and the
private sector. He is emphatically concerned about the prospects for a
149 Nathan Alexander Sales, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts
on the NSA Controversy, 1o ISJLP 523-550 (2014).
15o Id. at 547-548.
151 Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 1o ISJLP 551-579 (2014).
152 Reed E. Hundt, Making No Secrets About It, 1o ISJLP 581-598 (2014).
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kind of "corporatism" he thinks inimical to "both economic and social
freedom."153 Mr. Hundt argues that it is, in fact, secrecy, rather than
the fact of surveillance that is the fundamental problem with the
current system. He proposes an ambitious list of reforms aimed at
increasing what individuals know about their own targeting and what
the public knows about the scope of government programs, past and
present. Although his menu of suggestions includes an expansion of
warrant requirements, the weight of his argument really goes to the
public-ness of what the government is doing, reducing the likelihood
of abuse once information has been collected, and better managing
what could be the mind-boggling expense of managing security in the
digital domain-what Mr. Hundt calls "the staggering expenditures of
taxpayer funds."154
If Congress is to take on serious FISA modernization, however-
with a level of interbranch deliberation and public debate as robust as
in 1978-it could do no better than start with Professor Laura
Donohue's article with the simple title, FISA Reform.55 In an earlier
work,5 6 she has argued that a program entailing the interception of all
international communications fails the reasonableness test of Katz;
the compulsory involvement of private telecom companies and the
failure to prevent overbreadth render the program unconstitutional.
In this follow-up article, Professor Donohue maps out with
extraordinary care the menu of issues now presented for the
regulation of surveillance by the diversity of kinds of information at
stake and the diversity of media through which information is
accessed, transmitted and stored. She attends first to what might be
called the front-end issues of how information is to be collected, by
whom, and under what circumstances. She then considers back-end
issues, that is, controls on how data are analyzed, used, retained, and
transferred, as well as requirements for transparency, oversight and
accountability. Although she does not purport in this paper to resolve
these issues, her discussion is an invaluable roadmap to the policy
terrain that any thoroughgoing FISA rewrite should have to traverse.
Hovering quite conspicuously over all these important questions is
whether what might be called the "cybernation" of information-that
is, the revolution in the digitizing of information with its profound
153 Id. at 583.
154Id..
155 ISJLP 599-639 (2014).
156 Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations,37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 619-620 (2014).
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impacts on information storage, processing, and dissemination-
requires a comprehensive rethinking of the value, nature, and
protection of privacy. It is thus fitting that our concluding essay, by
the eminent sociologist Amitai Etzioni, elaborates what its author
takes to four core principles of what he calls a liberal communitarian
approach to cyber age privacy, along with a host of possible
operational implications.157 His paper functions as an invitation to
view the NSA disclosures as an occasion for embracing a yet wider
view, taking a systematic look at the principles we would wish to guide
information policy in the cyber age.
VI. A CONCLUDING NOTE ABOUT EXECUTIVE POWER
The Snowden leaks and the subsequent Obama Administration
declassifications have pointedly refocused Congress's attention on the
prospects for FISA reform. Both our elected branches appear to be
acting on the assumption that whatever legislation emerges will
actually govern how the NSA operates5S-whether its operations are
affirmed in their current scope, legislatively restricted, or, least likely,
authorized in yet more expansive terms. Professor Yoo, however,
advances in his paper a theory of executive authority that also
underlay his legal advice as a government official-a theory that casts
significant doubt on the imperative of legislative observance by the
executive branch. The core premise of his argument is as follows:
The Constitution vests the President with the executive
power and designates him Commander-in-Chief. The
Framers understood these powers to place the duty on
the executive to protect the nation from foreign attack
and the right to control the conduct of military
hostilities. To exercise that power effectively, the
President must have the ability to engage in electronic
surveillance that gathers intelligence on the enemy.159
157 Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: A Liberal Communitarian Approach, lo
ISJLP 641-669 (2014).
158 The Obama Administration is notably more reluctant than its predecessor to assert
presidential power, even in national security setting, to act beyond what Congress enacts
by way of statutory authority. Peter M. Shane, Executive Power, the Rule of Law and the
Obama Administration (unpublished manuscript).
159 Yoo, supra note 3, at 319 (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Yoo argues that it follows from this position that the
President does not need legislative authorization to conduct such
surveillance as he deems necessary to protect the United States
against foreign enemies; it follows further, in his view, that Congress
may not place any binding limitations on that authority. The function
of FISA, as Professor Yoo construes the Constitution, is neither to
enable, nor to limit national security surveillance per se; it is only to
prescribe a legal safe harbor within which the executive branch may
both engage in national security surveillance and use its fruits as
evidence in any criminal prosecutions that ensue.16o
A great deal is packed into that argument, which is important to
disentangle. First, putting aside controversial issues surrounding the
supposition of presidential authority to determine with whom we are
"at war" and of the consequent scope of commander-in-chief
authority, it strikes me as quite plausible that the founding generation
understood "executive power" to include some tacit authority to
engage in intelligence work against foreign powers. After all, neither
the durability of the new nation, nor even the congenial reception of
other nations to the United States could be taken for granted in 1789.
It is reasonable that the framers themselves would have read Article II
as empowering the President to keep tabs on foreign powers and their
agents as part of his inherent national security portfolio.
It does not follow from that observation, however, either that
Congress could not regulate his surveillance of foreign powers, much
less that the President would be deemed to have exclusive power
beyond the regulatory authority of Congress to engage in the
surveillance of Americans, especially in the absence of declared war.
Even if some version of the latter power might be thought to exist
absent a legislative charter, Congress's undoubted authority to
regulate our networks of electronic communication give it the right, at
its discretion, to legislate the circumstances under which Americans
may be brought within the government's surveillance umbrella. There
is no doubt that this is what Congress thought it was doing when it
enacted the original FISA.161
i6o Id. at 301-326.
161 "The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the
President may conduct electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the
Supreme Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: 'When a president takes measures
incompatible with the express or implied will of congress, his power is at the lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power minus any constitutional
power of congress over the matter.' Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952)." Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Conference Report, H. REP.
No. 95-1720. at 35.
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Prior to FISA, when Congress enacted its Title III procedure for
criminal surveillance warrants after the Katz decision, Congress
provided that "nothing contained in [Title III] or in section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of
the President ... to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States."162 But FISA replaced
that statement with language dictating that FISA and the criminal
code would be henceforth the "exclusive means" of conducting
electronic surveillance. Congress amended the criminal code to read
in unambiguous terms: "[P]rocedures in this chapter or chapter 121
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the
exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section
101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and
electronic communications may be conducted.1 63 Congress had been
confirmed in its authority to impose such a limitation by two
Attorneys General, Edward Levi and Griffin Bell.164
Congress repeated its position in enacting the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008. In the face of Justice Department opinions appearing to
suggest either that FISA had not definitively limited the executive
branch's surveillance authority or that the post-9/ll AUMF had
implicitly augmented that authority, Congress reasserted the
exclusivity point in Title 50 of the United States Code as well. FISA
now reiterates the strict limitations on those statutory sources of
authority on which the executive may rely to support electronic
surveillance and adds that any additional authorities may be found
only through subsequent "express statutory authorization," not
through mere implication. 65
It is imperative as a matter of democratic, constitutional self-
governance that the executive branch acquiesce in Congress's view.
Indeed, it may be this point-as much as the ex parte nature of FISC
proceedings-that explains the seemingly odd disjuncture, noted
above, between the FISC's apparent super-indulgence of
counterintuitive statutory interpretations by the executive branch and
its vigilance in the design and monitoring of provisions for
minimization and other matters of implementation. That is, by
162 Pub. L. No. 90-351, title III, § 802, 82 Stat. 213 (1968), repealed, Pub. L. 95-511, title II,
§ 201(a)-(c), 92 Stat. 1797 (1978).
163 Pub. L. No. 95-11, title II, § 201(a)-(c), 92 Stat. 1797 (1978), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(f).
164 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978).
165 Pub. L. No. 110-261, title I, § 102(a), 122 Stat. 2459, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812.
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accepting executive branch statutory interpretations that bring its
surveillance activities within the purview of statute, the court
accomplishes two things it might well consider important from a "rule
of law" point of view. First, it avoids sensitive questions of whether,
notwithstanding FISA, the executive could pursue certain kinds of
surveillance under inherent Article II authority-authority that the
FISC would not be entitled to supervise. Second, the statutory rubric
authorizes the FISC to impose limiting implementation requirements
in the name of privacy which the court does monitor rigorously and in
which the executive acquiesces-even, as with regard to bulk telephone
records, where the court's authority to impose such requirements
might be deemed questionable.
The FISC's institutional compromise, if I have correctly identified
it, is hardly perfect. Its acquiescence in novel statutory interpretations
looks like a disservice to a Congress that remains largely ignorant of
those interpretations. The public forum surrounding legislative
authorization is likely to be the only meaningful occasion for public
deliberation on the proper contours for programs of electronic
surveillance because there is quite likely to be no other context in
which the executive branch will publicize the scope of what it thinks it
needs to protect national security. If the FISC creates secret and
unanticipated readings of Congress's handiwork, the value of such
public deliberation is plainly called into question. And, of course, even
if the NSA conscientiously follows the FISC's administrative
requirements, the conscientious implementation of statutory
authority that cannot be defended as a plausible statutory reading
would still be an exercise in illegality.166 But, as I have argued
elsewhere, an executive branch that thinks its authority limited only
by its unilateral assessments of its inherent discretionary powers is far
more likely to overreach than an executive that thinks itself beholden
to legislative authorization.167 By helping to stabilize government
surveillance practice within a statutory framework, the FISC may still
be doing some significant service.
In the 1970s, it was the Church Committee that lent impetus to
both the reorganization of intelligence oversight in Congress and the
eventual enactment of FISA. Its investigation created a historical
record that Americans could rely on as a basis for democratic debate
about national security and intelligence gathering. Something similar
166 Christopher Sprigman, The NSA's Culture of 'Legal Compliance' Still Breaks the Law,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/2014/02/24/nsas-
culture-legal-compliance-breaks-law.
167 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE THREAT TO
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 113-142 (2009).
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should have happened in 2005-2oo6, when revelations about the
Bush Administration made clear that government lawyers thought
FISA did not constrain them. Instead, for better or worse-perhaps
both-the official inquiry and public debate that should have preceded
amendments to FISA instead were triggered only by massive
unauthorized leaks that revealed NSA surveillance of staggering
scope. The implications of the current debate are plainly profound for
both our future security and long- cherished American values. It
remains to be seen whether our national institutions are up to the
challenge.
